https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/02/hillary-clin...
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/05/fbi-no-charg...
Also:
https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/statement-by-fbi-dir...
"To be clear, this is not to suggest that in similar circumstances, a person who engaged in this activity would face no consequences. To the contrary, those individuals are often subject to security or administrative sanctions. But that is not what we are deciding now."
Public key encryption, like Signal uses, offers good security for most purposes. e.g. It's fantastic for credit card transactions. The problem with using it for transmitting state secrets is that you can't rely on it for long-term secrecy. Even if you avoid MITM or other attacks, a message sent via Signal today could be archived in ciphertext and attacked ten years from now with the hardware/algorithms of ten years in the future. Maybe Signal's encryption will remain strong in ten years. Maybe it will be trivial to crack. If the secrets contained in that message are still sensitive ten years from now, you have a problem.
Anything sent with Signal needs to be treated as published with an unknown delay. If you're sharing intelligence with the U.S., you probably shouldn't find that acceptable.
Maybe the DoD should work on developing some internal Android and Signal forks that focus on adding additional critical security controls without impacting usability. There's an obvious desire path here.
a) beaurocrats' real comms setups (3 telephones, four monitors all sitting on the desk – versus mounted on arms/wall) full of clutter and sitting on an anachronism of a wood desk
and b) what you'd see in any "spy" movie with dark-mode graphics displaying fancy l33t charts displayed on quad-monitor setups mounted on arms, probably in a low-light setting and the beaurocrat doesn't look at the "small" monitors himself, his cronies do that, the only monitor he looks at is the single 136" on the wall used for teleconferencing with villains
is hilarious
Say what you want about the usability of DoD home grown solutions, but it was a military system backed up by military budgets and guns - civilians are less likely to be collateral damage in an attack against these systems.
Now, all the civilians using Signal are potential splash damage casualties in a military conflict.
I also suspect Signal does not have the budget, staffing, or desire to serve as a front line soldier in a cyber war; but this exposes them to military-grade risks, whether they like it or not.
Get me inside the minds of these freaks.
1) He is avoiding some sort of corrupt signals intelligence folks from knowing what he's working on.
2) He is avoiding the government catching him in some corruption by avoiding the official records act.
Anything else?
I’m guessing that’s the product in question: https://www.vertiv.com/490454/globalassets/products/monitori...
During the UK Covid-19 enquiry into gov decision making at that time it came to light that most of the UK cabinet were co-ordinating via Whatsapp groups. Again, I'm not a fan of Boris and Dom Cummings but this makes some sort of sense to me. I recognise the need for government teams to have quick convenient chat available to them. Things move too fast these days to wait for the next cabinet meeting or to arrange things via a series of phone calls.
Similarly we can look back to Obama having to fight to keep his Blackberry in 2009 https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna28780205
1) DoD and other departments have either tacitly or explicitly approved the use of Signal for internal matters for several years now, with proper opsec.
2) You cannot govern exclusively from a SCIF, hence 1.
1. The Defense Department bans the use of Signal for everybody else. Why is that? Why is the Secretary exempt?
2. As we've seen it's pretty easy to add unauthorized people to what should be secure communication channels where classified information is shared; and
3. There are laws around the preservation of governmental records. Expiring Signal messages seems like it's intentionally meant to circumvent these legal requirements ie it's illegal.
We're only 100 days in. We've got 1200 more days of this.
... but unlike Signal, SDC respects laws requiring accurate record-keeping. And that's why this bunch of lawbreakers want to use Signal. They want to evade any and all accountability once this administration is over.
If someone gave me a whole set of locked down _windows_ computers and a bunch of achaic phone lines and told me to use them in 2025, I’d also try to circumvent such inconvenience.
Not to pick on this in particular – nearly all the reporting on this starts and ends with "Signal is insecure" as if that was all it took to be wrong. And in other eras, that was enough.
The man likes Signal. For better or worse, he is the Secretary of Defense...The man we've entrusted to help coordinate our national defense.
There's so many questions I genuinely don't have an answer for...
Has Congress made it illegal to use an off-brand messaging app for secure communications? _Why_ is it insecure? What is the probability that China is reading these messages in real-time? 100%? 25%? 0.2%?
We need to start from the presumption that the people-in-power don't care that it's always been done this way...in fact, they have a ton of pressure to be different. But, in some cases, these people may be willing to listen to reasonable arguments which clearly establish _why_ using Signal is unreasonably worse than using US Government Issue messaging.